

# **A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCEPT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**



**ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IRRI-KIIB)  
BRUSSELS, OCTOBER 2003**

## PREFACE

In December 2002, the Security & Global Governance Department of the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiated a strategic reflection on Europe's security policy. The European Union's common foreign and security policy, so it was felt, was lacking strategic clarity and a clear definition of its interests, its long-term foreign policy objectives and its priorities. An informal IRRI-KIIB working group was set up, comprising members from the diplomatic, military, intelligence and academic world, in order to forge a European security concept.

Early May 2003, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union tasked the High Representative, Mr. Javier SOLANA, with the elaboration of a draft strategic document. Mr. SOLANA presented his initial document, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', to the June European Council, which approved it as the basis for the elaboration of a comprehensive EU Security Strategy by the December 2003 European Council.

IRRI-KIIB's 'European Security Concept for the 21st Century' is a Belgian contribution to this major endeavour, which will shape the external action of the European Union in the years to come.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

1. The first responsibility of any government is to protect its citizens from harm and to provide them with an environment that induces confidence in the future. Europe as an ever closer Union shares this responsibility with its member states.
2. In the last two decades, we have witnessed dramatic changes in our environment. Europe is now integrated more deeply than ever before. The end of the Cold War and the bi-polar order are firmly behind us. The pace of globalisation has increased. Our world once again, but in a way different than before, became multi-polar. These changes have radically altered Europe's security. Based on their unique security approach of partially pooled sovereignty and institutionalised cooperation, the member states of the European Union are now at ease with **one another**. They no longer face any military threat amongst them. On the wider **European continent**, a system of intrusive reciprocal openness has been put in place and has replaced the balance of power. At the **global level**, interdependence has proven to be not just economic. It is also a political, a cultural and a security phenomenon, as was dramatically highlighted on 11 September 2001. Today, nobody can insulate its security from the rest of the world, since the ramifications of globalisation are borne in upon all.
3. Radically changed times call for radical adaptation of the way we view and handle security. Thirty-five years ago, Pierre Harmel succeeded in updating NATO's security policy from mere military defence into a long-term endeavour to foster an overall European settlement, based on political, economic and military rapprochement. Today's security policy needs a similar exercise.
4. The United States government has done its part of the job. In its National Security Strategy it has radically adapted its security policy to what it considers to be the main characteristics of today's world. Based upon their unparalleled military strength and political weight, the United States have embarked upon a policy that includes pre-emptive actions so as to forestall threats emanating from rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorist groups before they materialise. The European Union and its member states too are now in the process of similarly and collectively defining their long-term security interests and policies. IRRI-KIIB's **European Security Concept for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century** constitutes a Belgian contribution to this endeavour.
5. A European security concept is **an essential policy tool** that, starting from our interests and values, outlines the long-term overall objectives that we want to achieve and the basic categories of instruments that we will apply to that end. It is a strategy that serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving complex international environment. Implementing the security concept requires a regularly updated action plan. The security concept guides the definition of the civil and military capabilities that the European Union needs to develop.

## 2. A POWERFUL EUROPE

6. For the European security concept to be implemented, for it to materialize in the reality of international relations, the European Union must have the will and the capacity to bear on the course of international events and to weigh on the actors on the international scene. In one word, as the December 2001 Laeken Declaration states: the European Union is to become a **power**.
7. This powerful Europe, 'Europe-puissance', will never be conquering, expansionist, imperialist or hegemonic. A powerful Europe is that Europe which, having fully assimilated the lessons of its own suicidal wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, is at peace with itself; which has achieved decolonization without losing its identity; and which, through the project of European integration itself, has succeeded in reconciling hereditary enemies and in conceiving and implementing a model that guarantees the stability of relations between the member states while combining the need for integration with respect for the identity of each. A powerful Europe is that which by affirming its plain existence and its specificity as an actor bears witness to the feasibility and the achievements of a harmonious **model** of international relations, **organizing cooperation while respecting differences**.
8. Regardless of economic, political, demographic and military weight, there is no power without will. To play a part on the international stage, it does not suffice to take the current state of affairs for granted, to passively look to others to sort out problems or to systematically follow others' lead in dealing with them; power requires the will to make a proper mark on the course of events. The European Union will only be powerful if its member states consciously and collectively muster **the will to constitute one of the poles of the multi-polar world** and act accordingly.
9. Likewise, there is no power without **capacity for and autonomy of decision-making**. The capacity for decision-making rests on a political consensus on the overall objectives that are to be achieved, on efficacious decision-making mechanisms and on the maintenance of the scientific, industrial and financial basis that is needed to be able to decide freely on the initiation or pursuit of policy. Autonomy of decision-making means to be conscious of one's identity and sovereignty and thus to feel responsible to decide, without any inhibitions caused by a habit of dependence, submission or gratitude.

### 3. EUROPEAN SECURITY PRINCIPLES

10. Europe's long and often tragic history has conducted Europeans to view the world according to a number of values, principles and guidelines that will underlie any approach to defining their security policy.
11. The European Union is founded on the **principles** of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the member states. These same values underlie the European Union's external action.
12. Long-term security cannot but be **comprehensive**. The European Union sees politico-military means and power as part of a broader framework which *integrates* all fields of external action, at the level of both objectives and instruments. **Root causes** of instability and insecurity are diverse, thus a multidimensional response is needed, which emphasises **prevention**: a proactive rather than a reactive or curative approach, focussed on policy objectives rather than on threats.
13. Long-term security is based on **institutionalised, rule-based multilateralism**, to further predictability in today's multi-polar world, to confer legitimacy on the governance of this world and thus to enhance the effectiveness of governance.
14. The European Union acts through cooperation, consultation and partnership and strives for equitable relations with other nations, in which the same treatment applies to all. It is in Europe's interest and it is our historic responsibility **to make multilateralism work**. This will affirm the European Union as an international actor and will enhance the legitimacy of its external action as the first tranquil superpower in history.

#### 4. SECURITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

15. Within the borders of the European Union, member states are now definitively at ease with one another and no longer pose any mutual threat. Through the pursuit of the existing web of political, economic, social and military interdependence between current and, through enlargement, future member states the European Union will evolve into an **area of freedom, security and justice**.
16. The European Union's territory and population remain vulnerable however to the effects of global threats. In order to enhance the confidence of Europe's population, the European Union and its member states have equipped themselves with new instruments: a European Arrest Warrant, the Framework Definition on Terrorism and Eurojust. The effectiveness of this endeavour, while fully respecting our **civil liberties**, will be furthered by enabling full harmonisation of policies in areas commonly agreed upon, in particular terrorism, human trafficking, drugs trafficking, corruption, euro counterfeiting, arms trafficking, money laundering and organised crime.
17. The adoption of a **solidarity clause** will signal the evolution of the EU member states towards a political community, committing themselves to bringing mutual help and assistance in the face of risks of all nature. This will allow for the use of the mechanisms and assets of the European Security and Defence Policy in case of crises on the territory of the European Union, such as terrorist strikes or natural or man-made disasters, at the request of the member states concerned.
18. For the foreseeable future, the European Union and its member states no longer face any direct military threat to their **territorial integrity**. The mutual defence commitments to which the member states are bound, including the possibility of closer cooperation on mutual defence in the framework of the EU, serve as a long-term insurance against possible future threats. EU policies towards its proximity and at the global level must prevent such threats from materializing in the first place.

## 5. EUROPE'S PROXIMITY: NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICIES

19. Through the accession process, the European Union has been able to create stability in its proximity. By its **force of attraction**, not through coercion, has it succeeded in neutralizing the forces of minority disputes and border conflicts that looked particularly destabilizing less than a decade ago. The task at hand for the European Union is to replicate this success in a wider proximity. Here, the European Union will assume primary responsibility and will itself take the lead, since a stable neighbourhood is a necessity for our own security and promoting stability in our neighbourhood our duty.
20. The security environment in our proximity is different from that within the European Union. There remain challenging **pockets of regional instability and longstanding disputes** in our neighbourhood, both on the European continent and around it. Furthermore, **uncontrolled migration to the European Union**, especially when **linked to international organized crime**, clearly is a source of major anxiety in our public opinion.
21. The main EU instrument for promoting stability in its neighbourhood is the further development of its **Neighbourhood Policies**, which offer concrete benefits and preferential relations to neighbouring states in a wide range of fields, particularly with regard to market access and investment promotion. These benefits will be linked to progress made in defined areas, notably economic reform, democratization and respect for human rights, as well as substantial politico-military cooperation, in order to establish joint conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms, including joint measures to combat terrorism. The Neighbourhood Policies will strike a balance between bilateral relations, so that benefits and benchmarks for progress can be tailored to specific needs and circumstances, and multilateral partnerships, in order to deal with regional issues and promote regional integration between partners. Through the Neighbourhood Policies, states can come as close to the European Union as they can without being a member. To this end, the European Union will develop a new Neighbourhood Instrument that integrates existing financial instruments.
22. The **overall objectives** of these Neighbourhood Policies are:
- i. Preventing conflicts in our neighbourhood and acts of aggression against the European Union;
  - ii. Settling ongoing disputes and conflicts and ensuring long-term post-conflict peace-building;
  - iii. Establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security;
  - iv. Controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking towards the European Union;
  - v. Protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.
23. **Russia** is a strategic partner for the European Union, both on the continent and at the global level. Russia as a European power must become part of a wider area of cooperation in Europe. A stable, democratic and prosperous Russia is essential for lasting peace on the European continent. Through this strategic partnership, the European Union supports the consolidation of a stable and democratic Russia, governed by the rule of law. The European Union is looking forward to working closely with Russia, both to promote global security and to tackle common security challenges on the European continent, such

as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, through a close political and security dialogue and through concrete cooperation. The Permanent Partnership Council provides a strong institutional basis for the EU-Russia partnership, which will be given additional substance by the adoption of a revised common strategy that sets priority objectives and details instruments and means.

**Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus** present particular challenges for Europe's Neighbourhood Policies. Resolving the conflict over the self-declared independence of Moldova's Transnistria region is a primary issue for the EU-Russia partnership.

24. **Turkey** stands out as a vital partner which the European Union will closely integrate in a wider area of cooperation in Europe, in the prospect of EU membership. In particular, the European Union is looking forward to increase its political and security dialogue with Turkey and will invite it to join in concrete politico-military cooperation. Implementation of the pre-accession partnership, in particular an early resolution of the Cyprus issue and consolidation of respect for human rights, is an integral element of this deepened cooperation.
25. The consolidation of stability on the **Balkans** and their progressive integration into the European Union are an inherent part of our Neighbourhood Policies. The Stabilisation and Association Process supports reform in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in order to pave the way to full membership of the European Union. A necessary prerequisite is the establishment of regional cooperation among these states. Another issue of particular importance is an enhanced partnership, for the benefit of both the European Union and the Balkan states, in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, as the Western Balkans are the main gateway to the European Union for illegal immigration, human trafficking, prostitution and drugs.
26. In the Mediterranean, the European Union will deepen the **Euro-Mediterranean Partnership** with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. The Union will take the necessary measures and will provide the corresponding budgets to make the Partnership's economic and financial basket work, so as to offer concrete benefits to the partners. At the same time, conditionality of support will be increased by linking it to living up to commitments under the political and security basket, notably with regard to democratization and respect for human rights. In the same light, substance must be given to politico-military cooperation. Our long-term objective in the politico-military field is the establishment of permanent Euro-Mediterranean mechanisms for early warning and crisis management, which can be achieved through the Mediterranean partners' active participation in the European Security and Defence Policy, and the achievement of substantial non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, which must lead to a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The cultural basket is a vital asset to promote shared values, with the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation as the main instrument. The European Union will continue to promote regional integration between the Mediterranean partners. As a necessary prerequisite to a deepening of the Partnership, the European Union will actively contribute to revitalizing the Middle East Peace Process, which is the main factor determining the willingness of the Mediterranean states to engage in partnership. The European Union will encourage Libya to accept the Barcelona acquis and join the Partnership.



27. Beyond our immediate proximity, **Africa** is of particular importance to Europe. Common cultural and historic bonds, the importance of European markets for African products and the position of Europe as main donor to Africa have created a solid network of contractual arrangements between both partners. This comprehensive partnership, based on political dialogue, preferential trade arrangements, significant aid resources and the commitment to strengthen African capabilities and means of action in the field of prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts, needs to address the overwhelming problems on the African continent in a more systematic and coordinated way, including in the security field. It is in the interest of both Africa and Europe that this continent breaks away from its extreme external dependence and from the vicious cycle of permanent conflict and crisis. The creation of a permanent African stabilisation force is one of the instruments that the European Union will actively contribute to, in close partnership with the African Union.

## 6. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONALIZED MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

28. The ultimate systemic threat to world security and international stability is the **ever growing gap between haves and have-less's**. Its effects are like global warming: the consequences are diffuse and only perceptible in the long term. But at a certain level of inequality the resulting political instability, extremism, economic unpredictability and appalling migration flows will become uncontrollable, as Europe dramatically experienced in the 1930s.
29. The primary purpose of the European Union's global ambitions is to achieve an effective system of co-operative **global governance**, legitimised by representative institutions and the rule of law. Similar to a nation-state, global governance has to concentrate on **core public goods**. We consider these to be:
- **international stability and security**, for which the greatest powers carry the main responsibility;
  - an **open economic world system** that meets the needs of all, especially the poorest, so as to enable all to participate fully in decision-making;
  - an **international legal order** which should ensure the effective equality of all;
  - **global welfare** as the global equivalent of national human security systems; and finally,
  - a shared commitment to **settle regional conflicts**.<sup>1</sup>
30. The task of overcoming the dark side of globalisation requires the cooperation of all nations. Great powers have the greatest responsibility in projecting stability in the world at large. The European Union provides for the greatest share of development aid and is a major contributor to peacekeeping operations, but nevertheless in the past it has been unable to carry the same weight at the global level as in its neighbourhood. In the global environment, **politico-military power** plays a more prominent role than on the European continent. Projection of military power may constitute a necessary means in order to assure international stability.
31. Indeed, against this background of globalisation and the need for global governance, specific politico-military challenges stand out as particular concerns for international peace and security. They must be effectively addressed by, and for the sake of, the international community as a whole:
- i. Proliferation of **weapons of mass destruction**;
  - ii. **Excessive militarization**;
  - iii. **Terrorism**;
  - iv. **Failed states and civil wars**;
  - v. **Regions of chronic tension and longstanding disputes**.
32. The main instrument through which the European Union contributes to global security is the strengthening of today's often embryonic **institutions and mechanisms for global action**. This also applies to the politico-military field, in which the European Union will promote the following tools:

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<sup>1</sup> Under the heading 'Global governance: the next frontier', IRRI-KIIB is also elaborating a concept of global governance.

- i. Establishing an effective crisis management capacity for the United Nations, notably by creating efficient decision-making mechanisms and providing sufficient stand-by forces, to which the European Union will contribute with its military capabilities, in order to enable the Security Council to act rapidly and effectively;
- ii. Contributing with expertise and means to the creation of conflict prevention mechanisms and to the building of local crisis management capabilities in key regions, among others Central Africa;
- iii. Terrorism: at the same time as enhancing intra-EU coordination and policy harmonisation, the European Union looks forward to working more effectively with other partners, within the framework of multilateral arrangements. A **UN Counter-Terrorism Agency** would be able to coordinate the work of the different UN, regional and national bodies that are active in the fight against terrorism. This agency should integrate the whole range of available instruments to disrupt and destroy the capability for command & control, the finances and the material resources of terrorist organizations.
- iv. Enhancing the **institutional links between national law enforcement agencies** in order to act effectively against multidimensional and internationally organised criminal networks involving drugs trafficking, money laundering and human trafficking;
- v. Promoting accession to and verification of the key multilateral agreements on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament:
  - a. by strengthening the existing independent agencies;
  - b. entrusting them through the Security Council with a broader mandate and capabilities for ad hoc and long-term on site inspections and monitoring to ensure compliance;
  - c. by member states providing them with all available intelligence.

This implies in particular:

1. Establishing a **UN Counter-Proliferation Committee** under the Security Council to monitor compliance with relevant agreements and resolutions and to coordinate, if need be, the different UN, regional and national bodies;
2. Strengthening the verification and enforcement mechanisms of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;
3. Strengthening the inspection regime under the Non Proliferation Treaty;
4. Enacting legal instruments that would empower the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify compliance and render the organisation less dependent on the member states;
5. Increasing efforts in the field of export controls, both within the European Union and in cooperation with partners, to prevent dangerous materials from falling into the wrong hands;
6. Undertaking effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, notably by banning testing and production of nuclear materials with a military application and by resuming the efforts to

create regional zones free of weapons of mass destruction, especially in the Middle East.

- vi. Reinvigorating the international efforts, as initiated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), to collectively identify the circumstances in which the principle of non-intervention yields to the international community's **responsibility to protect**: civil war, genocide, gross and persistent human rights violations, support for international terrorism, the use or threat of weapons of mass destruction.
  - vii. Promoting regional integration, building upon the European experience, in order to consolidate peaceful relations between states and strengthen states' position in the global order, so as to improve their access to the core global public goods; to that end, regional organizations such as ASEAN, Mercosur, the GCC, SADC, ECOWAS and the African Union are key partners.
33. The European Union will wage an **integrated policy**. Partnership and cooperation with states and regions in a wide range of fields, which thus have a wide and permanent preventive scope, will be linked to compliance with political – human rights, rule of law, democratization – and politico-military – non-proliferation, defensive posture – commitments. Permanent monitoring of potentially destabilizing developments must provide the basis for early warning and conflict prevention in order to forestall crises, using the whole range of instruments available to the European Union, including the non-coercive use of military instruments (e.g. observer and peacekeeping missions). The European Union must also develop instruments to respond to cases in which states do not live up to their commitments, in particular a **catalogue of effective sanctions** that can be put to use according to specific circumstances.
34. The coercive use of military power is a last resort in the European approach to security, to be considered only if all other means have clearly failed, with an explicit mandate of the Security Council. Under those conditions the European Union is to show no hesitation to act militarily. If however the Security Council, whose authorization should in all cases be sought prior to action being taken, proves unable to act in a situation where the responsibility to protect is evident, then as the ICISS has outlined: the consent of the UN General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the Uniting for Peace procedure can be sought; or action within its area of jurisdiction by a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter can be envisaged, subject to it seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council. Pre-emptive coercive military action on the initiative of the European Union or its Member States is not in our intention however: since Article 51 of the UN Charter allows military action by way of self-defence only *after* an armed attack occurs, the Security Council is the only body that can legally – and legitimately – decide on any other form of coercive military action. Hence the need to strengthen the decision-making capacity and legitimacy of the Security Council.

## 7. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

35. The **United Nations** provide for the primary, overall global security framework, where common approaches to common challenges are jointly envisaged and elaborated. Reinforcing the politico-military institutions of the United Nations, notably making the Security Council more representative, is the first step towards effective and legitimate international security management. The European Union will furthermore reinforce its close partnership for conflict prevention with the United Nations, in particular through intelligence sharing and coordination of policy-making and capability-building.
36. Within this overall framework and in order to sustain a multi-polar world, the European Union is looking forward to working together in **strategic partnerships with other great powers**, in particular the United States, Russia and China, but also with the states in its neighbourhood. For such partnerships to become reality, the European Union will actively participate in global agenda-setting.
37. The European Union looks forward to an equitable and comprehensive **transatlantic partnership**. The means of the European Union and the United States combined present no less than an unparalleled force that, if both partners are willing to, can uphold an effective system of global governance, including an open economic world order that meets the needs of all.
38. In the politico-military field, the transatlantic partnership is embodied in the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**. Now that it has the necessary institutional and military capabilities at its disposal to act autonomously, the European Union can implement military operations in support of its global and neighbourhood policies and will assume first-level responsibility in the event of crises in its periphery. This burden-sharing will contribute to transform NATO into an equitable, two-pillar Alliance, in which both partners have responsibilities and both are able to call upon the Alliance and its assets according to pre-arranged mechanisms, in particular when the means of one of them prove insufficient to resolve a crisis or if the European Union and the United States agree to be jointly involved in an operation from the very beginning. In the case of threats to the territorial integrity of either partner, the mutual defence guarantee under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty provides the ultimate security guarantee.
39. As a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and with its broad membership, the **Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe** is a primary actor in the field of preventive diplomacy based on the link between peace and security and shared values such as democracy and respect for human rights. In the 1970s the CSCE/OSCE was one of the first major endeavours to forge a common and autonomous European approach to foreign policy. The European Union has to strengthen its role as the anchor of the OSCE mechanism, by speaking with one voice and thus being able to bear on the future organisation of a cooperative European continent, sharing the values as put forward in the 1990 Charter for a New Europe. Close coordination of policies with regard to the European continent and the Mediterranean will make the European Union and the OSCE truly complementary.

## 8. COMMITTING THE NECESSARY RESOURCES AND INSTRUMENTS

40. In order to be able to act effectively in the pursuit of its security policy, the European Union will provide itself with the necessary **instruments** and must commit the necessary **means**.
41. Introducing qualified majority voting across the board in Justice and Home Affairs and giving **Europol and Eurojust** more operational powers and more investigative and prosecutorial resources, under the control of the European Court of Justice, will enhance our capacity to deal efficiently with the effects of global threats on the internal security of the European Union. Setting up a specific European Unit will ensure more effective management of the **external borders** of the Schengen area.
42. A comprehensive approach requires an organisation that allows for the permanent **coordination of all dimensions of external action** and for **rapid decision-making** in times of crisis. The further development of the Commission's Rapid Reaction Mechanism and the rapid reaction facilities of the European Security and Defence Policy will enhance the European Union's ability to then rapidly implement decisions on the ground with both civil and military means. Operation Artemis in the Congo is an example of what the European Union can achieve.
43. In order to underpin policy-making, the European Union will develop an autonomous and effective capability for **intelligence sharing and gathering** and for joint **analysis**. This will enable **permanent monitoring** and **early warning**, in an integrated way, by reinforced bodies, notably the Council's Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and the Commission's Crisis Room. Regularly updated Country and Regional Strategy Papers and Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans, the Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict and the continually revised Watch List of Priority Countries, and the deployment of Conflict Prevention Teams are vital instruments for guiding EU policies, notably action for conflict prevention. With regard to fighting terrorism and organised crime, an absolute prerequisite is the collection and sharing of information on patterns of criminal behaviour and, in more operational terms, on persons suspected of involvement in such crimes.
44. The continued development of civilian capabilities, notably with regard to **police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection**, will ensure that the European Union has at its disposal a complete set of instruments to deal with all types of contingencies, in the framework of conflict prevention, crisis management as well as post-conflict peace-building. The building of sufficient **police units** that can be deployed for international operations is an area of particular importance.
45. In the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, the European Union will continue to develop its military capabilities, in order to enhance the credibility of its global and neighbourhood policies. The capacity for rapid reaction, projectability and sustainability determine the effectiveness of European forces in a globalized environment. Further **integration of national armed forces** is the principal means to increase efficiency and interoperability. This will be pursued through the creation of a European operational headquarters, and through multinational cooperation, pooling of means and task specialisation around cores of excellence, on the basis of planning at the European level that is to be implemented by the EU Military Staff according to the objectives fixed by the Ministers of Defence on the advice of the EU Military Committee. The aim is to

provide the European Union with an enhanced catalogue of capabilities that makes use of the full potential of member states' armed forces and to ensure that each member state contributes its fair share. This will enable the European Union to field more rapid reaction forces that are capable of implementing the full range of Petersberg tasks at any scale: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

46. Enhanced cooperation during the whole cycle of **defence procurement** (from identification and harmonization of needs, over orientation of R&D, to the setting-up of co-production programmes and joint off-the-shelf procurement and the elaboration of mechanisms for joint financing), on the basis of the capability gaps identified by EU planning, will further allow for the most efficacious and efficient use of defence equipment budgets. A defence industrial policy is a necessary complement: establishing an open European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) by removing all remaining trade barriers, promoting integration in the defence industry, and identifying and safeguarding those industrial elements deemed to be vital to the Defence Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) of the European Union. Centres of technological excellence will be identified so that European capacities can be pooled on a sectional basis.

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