Liens
 
 For a European Conference on Threat Perception
For a European Conference on Threat Perception
The recent events linked to the war in Iraq, have shaken, if not maimed, the unsteady foundations of the European Union institutions related to security and defense.
For any observer with some experience in strategic analysis, in crises management in different theaters and during different periods, this negative trend can stem from several differing causes:

Third, it can be the result of the deliberate action of entities that might not be favorably disposed to the development of a cohesive, strong, mature and competent Union. Second, or equally, the no less evident lack of maturity of some of the actors.First cause, the lack of maturity of the institutions.

In addition to these combined causes, and seen from a higher perspective, it clearly appears that the European Union is lacking a common perception of dangers, risks and threats. This seems to be true in all the fields of its activities and endeavours. It is no longer appropriate to deal in isolation with politics, defense, military economy, security, development, health, crime and good governance. All these domains exist in a continuous process of interaction and transformation. It is precisely what the experts call in fashionable jargon "the Security Sector".
By clearly setting out and assessing the range of possible threats, risks and potential menaces, we shall be able to systematically fortify a common security, foreign and defense policy in an enlarged Europe and, ultimately, to establish adequate security structures and capabilities. This concerns not only defense potential, but also public order and law enforcement institutions, border protection services, intelligence sharing, military industrial cooperation, joint information infrastructure and alike. Only such an approach will permit us to decrease the old emphasis on national territorial defense and individual preparedness against the new challenges of the present day and to build up a true European security and defense capability, able to function as a real partner in the transatlantic community.
We could therefore incriminate the lack of maturity in the European Institutions as well as in the Euro Atlantic and Euro Asiatic organizations. It is true that they are, at leastin the first case, relatively recent: the EU has not yet had the opportunity to take concrete actions. Beyond any doubt, Macedonia will be their first political military test bed.
The required capacities are hampered by weak national defense budgets entirely incompatible with the magnitude of the new security challenges and in great disproportion to the military outlays of the American superpower.
There will be no European diplomacy as such until the European Convention, if successful, carves in the marble of a Constitution the modalities of its functioning and the foundation of its existence. What we have heard so far is the astounding cacophonic expression of the "Europe des Nations". Lacking mature and well-designed institutions, Europe can only be heard through dissenting voices. But are such institutions truly desired?
This question needs to be posed because, under the present circumstances, the lack of maturity of some actors has been evidenced. Immaturity and incoherence have impacted on the recent debates. Twelve years is probably not enough to realize that switching from one world to another, one has not only to change one’s skin but also transform one’s nature. The role of the dream is still very strong in many countries that have emerged from a world oppressed and deprived of freedom. They have had a hard time overcoming this intellectual scheme and they need a new tutorship to embolden them to undertake decisions, making a difference between poverty and development, collectivism and liberalism, instability and balance, in a word, between shadow and light. All of us in Europe have American uncles: but they are in America and we are in Europe. Maturity, today, for all the Europeans, is to acknowledge and act according to this simple fact.
On the other side of the coin, the maturity we have in mind means also a serious challenge for those who lived so far within the confines of the self-assured and convenient realm of the Western part of the continent. Here, maturity is required to lead the European dialogue with a positive attitude towards the aspirations, experiences and peculiarities of the new partners. To organize a Europe of 26 or more states around difficult political purposes is much more complex task than giving a lead to a more coherent and smaller group of 15.
The only true help in time of crisis and the real organic cohesion and growth that can be expected and obtained is from within our own continent and from regional interstate solidarity. Maturity, today, for all the Europeans, is to acknowledge this other simple fact. We still are far from the goal, but there is no escape lane, except one: to stop the European build up.
And here is the key point of the current situation. In addition to the individual and collective lack of maturity, another danger looms for Europe: the devastating behavior of all those state actors and/or transnational caucuses and lobbies for which the development of a European entity of Security and Defense is not opportune. Far from spilling oil on the fire, the attentive analysis of official statements, internal decisions regarding debates in international organizations and editorials and of polls will allow us, without a major error margin, to identify the friends and the foes. Administrations change, and from a long-termperspective the extraordinary European adventure of European integration could be perceived positively by agovernment, and very adversely by the next one. The shift can take place practically overnight.
It would not be of such significance if, on our continent, some stakeholders were not contributing voluntarily to weakening an endeavor they have adhered to or aspired to be part of. To be European does not imply a renunciation of bilateral agreements but does suggest that they will coincide with the interests of the young Union.
There might be differences in perception between states that can easily be overcome by dialogue; but there should be no incoherence. And that, unfortunately, seems to be happening today.
And it takes a measure of necessary good will to see the objective reasons for differences in various national views regarding the threat perceptions and security policies of the new partners from the East. Their geopolitical locations, historical experiences, traditions, are vastly different from those of their Western cousins. And, in the past they were often overlooked and their concerns ignored. It is not only opportunistic when they look for assurances beyond the Atlantic; they might simply seek to play it safely. Their thinking may not be based on actual or tangible risks but it is difficult for them to forget the past and be assured about the future, even if they see the prospect of being more secure within the confines of the integrated Union. The differences in the national policies designed to confront these concerns should not, however, be seen as incompatible with the wider European process of integration. It is not inconceivable that a consensus could be created, and also a political framework, in which the individual, sub-regional, and pan-European concerns will fall in place, would create a basis for real solidarity among all, even among those located at the opposing fringes of Europe, East and West, North and South. A condition for this solidarity is, first of all, clarity of these various specific concerns and, second, the existence of a joint mechanism and of agreed methods intended to respond to particular, even local, concerns.
Without too much naivety but with some optimism, we could think that such incoherent behavior stem from differing perceptions of dangers, risks and threats. In that order: a danger compromises the security of persons and goods. A risk is the possibility of something bad happening at sometime in the future. A threat is the manifestation of somebody one’s discontent and intention to harm.
However, what do we notice on our old continent? There exists a total lack of dialogue concerning these topics. Every country is debating them, more or less. And, from their analysis, reflections, assessments and alignments, they draw conclusions, generally presented as a white paper on defense, a national security strategy or defense estimates.
Is it just a matter of expert work at a time when security is no longer about tackling separately different issues but addressing them in an integrated manner?
What are the levels and the intensity of defense and security debates in the parliaments? Only night owls can follow talk shows broadcast late in the night and on very few and not so well known radio and TV channels.
The future of the very young European Union relies less on its institutional structures than on the capability of its members to develop common objectives. And, even if the Euro has been a blatant demonstration of such capability, quite a few sources of concern remain in the field of defense and security.
The anti-American propaganda disseminated in Europe by host of media and of political figures is paralleled in the United States where an increasing number of citizens and executives have been perceiving Europe as a region characterized by a nascent neutralism but a continued reliance on American security and defense capabilities (at the expense of the American tax payers).
Reason and dialogue must supersede the current hysterical and theological squabbles that are impeding any positive evolution. The characteristics of the international system have been fundamentally challenged: the United Nations Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union are in a deep state of shock. And this happens when the terrorist threat bears upon social and international cohesion, weapons of mass destruction alter the balance of powers and threaten the very existence of sovereign nation states… at a time when international cooperation is needed as never before.
Besides, have we really to refrain from action until the outward sign of a deadly threat turns red? It is a risk that very few countries are ready to take. The "preventive and preemptive actions" concept could find some justification in this context. But for the time being, it remains "an American exception".
It is therefore high time for all Europeans to gather, all fifteen and all the candidates, with their differences - which make them valuable - to reflect together on the dangers they face in the fields of national interest, health, economy, development and security.
But only a European Conference on the perception of threats, dangers and risks of all kinds will bring about a common vision. This will comprise the foundations and the consent to a mature, coherent and efficient European Defense and Security Policy. From cacophony we shall end up in symphony.
We owe that to future generations.
General Alain FAUPIN - Andrzej KARKOSZKA (former deputy Defence minister of Poland)


17, juillet 2006
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

  [ Accueil ] [ Mentions légales ] © Copyright 2006 Forum Carolus Réalisation First System Online